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Abstract 
 
How does labor market competitiveness frame the impact of greater labor 
productivity and lower inequality on poverty? Specifically, does greater 
competitiveness increase the impact of higher labor productivity and lower 
inequality on poverty reduction? In a simple model, we show that there is 
complementarity between competitiveness and productivity – the greater is 
one, the larger is the impact of the other. This suggests that improving labor 
market competitiveness is worthwhile not only for its own sake, but because it 
improves the transmission mechanism from productivity increases to poverty 
reduction. We also derive precise conditions under which there is a similar 
complementarity between equality and competitiveness in poverty reduction.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the implications of employer power for poverty, and in particular, for 
the impact of productivity growth on poverty. We show that there can be complementarity 
in poverty reduction between labor market competitiveness, viewed in this way, and 
productivity. The greater is one, the larger is the impact of an improvement in the other. 
This suggests that reducing employer power in labor markets is worthwhile not only for its 
own sake, but also because it improves the transmission mechanism from productivity 
increases to poverty reduction. We also derive precise conditions under which there is a 
similar complementarity between equality and competitiveness in poverty reduction.  
There exist two strands of literature that are related to our paper. On the one hand, there is 
an extensive literature on the linkage between growth, inequality and poverty in the context 
of globalization.3 Although whether or not globalization helps reduce inequality and/or 
poverty is one of the hottest issues among economists and the debate seems to remain 
unsettled, there should be no denying that globalization affects several aspects 
simultaneously, including labor productivity, inequality, and market competitiveness. Since 
all of these affect the lives of the poor, it is important to consider within a framework how 
these factors interact with one another in determining the extent of poverty in an economy. 
What make our analysis unique are twofold. First, when the effects of globalization are 
considered, it is almost always the case that labor markets are assumed to be perfect. We 
investigate the impact of productivity and inequality on poverty in a wide range of labor 
market competitiveness. Second, in addition to the direct effect of each factor on poverty, 
we also explore the interactions between them. For example, we ask "how is the marginal 
change in poverty with an increase in competitiveness affected by increases in labor 
productivity?"  
On the other hand, there is an ongoing active debate on the plausibility of perfect labor 
market. Most labor economists seem to hold the view that labor markets (at least in the 
U.S.) can be well approximated by the model of perfectly competitive markets. However, 
given the growing evidence, direct or indirect, on the existence of labor markets in which 
employers have non-negligible market power over their workers, studies on imperfect labor 
                                                 
3 For recent work, see, for example, Aisbett (2003); Dollar and Kraay (2004); Basu (2006); Dollar (2005); 
Nissanke and Thorbecke (2006); Harrison (2006). 
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markets have grown rapidly in recent years.4 In particular, in developing countries, it is 
often the case that workers live far from firms and so transportation costs are very high. In 
such a case, it is more likely that firms exert market power. Therefore it seems to be quite 
plausible to allow a wide range of competitiveness in the analysis of labor markets. The 
paper attempts this. The contribution of the paper in terms of labor market competitiveness 
is as follows. Past studies on imperfect labor markets explore wage dispersion, the market 
provision of general training, and minimum wages and their effects on unemployment, 
among others.5 This paper investigates the effects of productivity and inequality on poverty 
for different degrees of labor market competitiveness.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model. Section 3 shows 
complementarity between labor productivity and labor market competitiveness, while 
Section 4 investigates complementarity between inequality and competitiveness in poverty 
reduction. Section 5 concludes the paper. An Appendix provides some generalizations to 
the results of the paper.  
 
2. The Model 
We will develop a specialized, tractable model that allows us to address the questions 
posed. Let us suppose that individuals are distributed uniformly along a line segment on the 
x -axis, , as depicted in Figure 1. Firms are located at . So  is the 
average distance, or lack of access, to the firms and 
[m k m k− , + ]
)
0x = m
(k m≤  is a parameter describing the 
extent of inequality in terms of access to the labor market. Without loss of generality, 
population size is normalized to unity. Thus the density function of the distribution of 
individuals is given by ( ) 1 2f x = / k
]
. If the firms offer some wage rate w , and if an 
individual at [x m k m k∈ − , +  works for a firm, her net income is given by 
( )y w x w tx, = − . The parameter  could be interpreted simply as the cost of mobility 
or, more generally, as transaction costs that are associated with finding and working for a 
( 0)t ≥
                                                 
4 For the evidence on the imperfectness of labor markets, see Sullivan (1989), Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs 
(1999), and the papers listed in the next footnote. Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002) and Manning (2003) 
provide surveys. 
5 For wage dispersion and oligopsonistic labor markets, see, for example, Bhaskar and To (2003). For the 
market provision of general training, see Stevens (1994) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999). The literature on 
minimum wages and labor market competitiveness is large. See, for example, Stigler (1946); Card and 
Krueger (1994, 1995, 2000); Bhaskar and To (1999); Neumark and Wascher (2000). 
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firm. We assume that individuals have no earnings opportunity outside the economy.6 
Hence given , the individuals in [w ]m k w t− , /  work for the firms, while the individuals in 
 do not.(w t m k/ , + ] 7 Thus the labor supply function and the inverse labor supply function 
are respectively given by  
 
1( ) [ ( )]
2
wS w m k
k t
= − −  (1) 
and  
 2 (w ktl m k)t= + −  (2) 
For the demand side of the labor market, let us suppose that there exist n  firms at 0x = . 
We consider the effects of productivity and inequality on poverty for different degrees of 
market competitiveness, wherein market competitiveness is measured by the number of 
firms. So  is treated as a parameter to be varied. All firms have the same revenue 
function, , where  denotes the number of workers employed, and 
 and  are technological parameters describing labor productivity and 
diminishing marginal product, respectively. In what follows, productivity growth is 
captured by increases in . Given the revenue function and a wage rate , the firm’s 
profit function is given by 
n
2( )i i iR l a al bl, = − / 2
il
il
0a > 0b >
a w
( ) ( )i il R l a wπ = , − . Each firm maximizes profit given the labor 
supply and the other firms’ labor demand. Since the firms’ technology is identical, we 
restrict ourselves to symmetric Nash equilibria in terms of employment.  
The equilibrium employment and wage are calculated as follows. Given (2) and the other 
firms’ labor demand, , firm ’s profit function is of the form  il− i
 2( ) [2 ( ) (
2i i i i i i i
bl l a m k t al l kt l l m k t lπ − −; , , , , = − − + + − ) ]  
By differentiating π  with respect to , and then substituting (  for il 1) in − l il− , the 
equilibrium labor demand of each firm when there exist n  firms in the market is given by  
 
( )
2 ( 1)i
a m k tl
b kt n
∗ − −= + +  (3) 
Thus the equilibrium (total) employment and wage are, respectively,  
                                                 
6 A positive reservation wage does not affect the basic results of this paper. 
7 In this paper, we focus on the case in which labor productivity is not high enough to ensure full 
employment. So we suppose that  always holds. w t m k/ < +
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[ ( )
2 ( 1)i
n a m k tl nl
b kt n
∗ ∗ ]− −= = + +  (4) 
and  
 
[2 ( 2 )( )]
2 ( 1)
t akn b kt m kw
b kt n
∗ + + −= + +  (5) 
 
Note that letting n  offers the competitive employment and wage:→∞ 8  
 
( )
2c
a m k tl
kt
− −=  
 
 cw a=  
 
Throughout our analysis, poverty is measured using the poverty measure which has been 
developed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984):  
 
0
( ) ( )
z z yP g
z
α
α y dy
−= ,∫  
where z  is the (fixed) poverty line and  is the density function of income distribution. g α  
is a parameter, increases in which make the measure more sensitive to the gaps between the 
poverty line and income levels below it. We consider 0α =  and 1α ≥ .  
By changing the variables, the poverty measure is also expressed as  
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )
w
t
w z w
t t
m kz w txP f x dx f x dx
z
α
α −
+− −= +∫ ∫  
if , and  ( )y w m k z, − >
 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )
w
t
w
t
m k
m k
z w txP f x dx
z
α
α
+
− f x dx
− −= +∫ ∫  
if ( )y w m k z, − ≤ . In the case of a uniform distribution, ( ) 1 2f x = / k
]
 for all 
[x m k m k∈ − , + , so the above expressions are simplified as:  
                                                 
8 The numerator of  is the income of the richest individual when the market is competitive. cl
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11 [ ( ) ] if ( ) (
2 (1 )
1 [ ( )]{ [1 ( ) ] ( ) } if 0 ( )
2 (1 )
z wm k y w m k z
k t t
P
z z w t m k wm k y w m k z
k t z t
α
α
α
α
+
⎧ + + − , − >⎪ +⎪= ⎨ − − −⎪ − + + − < ,⎪ +⎩
6)
(7)− ≤
 (8) 
 
 
In this paper, we consider the case where the richest individuals in the economy are not 
poor: ( )y w m k z, − > . In this case, by (2) and (8), the poverty measure is further simplified 
as follows:  
 (1 )
2 (1 )
zP
ktα α l
∗= + −+  (9) 
The above expression tells us that, given  and t , the poverty measure solely depends on 
the amount of employment.  
k
 
3. Labor Productivity, Competitiveness and Poverty 
As shown in (9), in our model, poverty depends on productivity, , and the number of 
firms, , solely through the impact on employment. By differentiating (4), we get  
a
n
 2
[ ( ) ]( 2 ) 0
[ 2 ( 1)]
l a m k t b kt
n b kt n
∗∂ − − += >∂ + +  (10) 
 
 0
2 ( 1)
l n
a b kt n
∗∂ = >∂ + +  (11) 
 
 2
2( ) ( )
[ 2 ( 1)]
l l b kt
a n n a b kt n
∗ ∗∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + 0= =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + + >  (12) 
 
Thus, an increase in competitiveness (larger number of firms) increases employment, as 
does an increase in productivity, as is to be expected. But (12) gives a result that is less 
obvious – there is complementarity between productivity and competitiveness in enhancing 
employment and thus in reducing poverty.  
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The complementarity result can be understood as follows. Since il nl
∗ ∗= , differentiating 
the total demand gives  
 ( 0)ii
ll l n
n n
∗∗
∗ ∂∂ = + >∂ ∂ ,  
where the first term in the right side is the increase in employment due to the entry of a 
new firm, and the second one is  times the decrease in each firm’s employment because 
of increased competitiveness. By differentiating the derivative with respect to , we have  
n
a
 ( ) ( )i il ll n
a n a a n
∗ ∗∗ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
The first and second terms of the right side of the above expression are the effects of an 
increase in productivity on each firm’s employment, and on the marginal change in each 
firm’s employment with an increase in competitiveness pre-multiplied by the number of 
firms, respectively (Figure 2). As is easily seen in Figure 2, the higher labor productivity, 
the greater the decrease in each firm’s employment that is caused by an increase in 
competitiveness. So the second term is negative. However, (12) shows that this negative 
effect is dominated by the increase in employment due to higher productivity.  
For poverty, what this says is that (i) an increase in labor market competitiveness has a 
bigger impact on poverty reduction the higher is firms’ productivity, and (ii) an increase in 
labor productivity has a bigger impact on poverty reduction the more competitive is the 
labor market. Thus competitiveness policy is pro-poor in the following two ways. First, it 
directly reduces poverty by inducing higher levels of employment. Second, it enhances the 
beneficial effect of productivity growth on poverty.  
 
4. Inequality, Competitiveness and Poverty 
In the previous section, we have seen how the changes in the demand side of the labor 
market affect poverty. In this section, we consider the cases in which the conditions of 
individuals, in addition to the degree of market competitiveness, change. In particular, to 
examine how different types of changes in individuals’ access to the labor market affect 
poverty among them, we study the effects on poverty of distributional shifts, measured by 
changes in k , and increases in transaction/transportation cost, .  t
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Clearly, as  increases, the distribution of individuals becomes more unequal. For the sake 
of simplicity, let us consider the case of a linear revenue function . Then by 
differentiating (4) with respect to , we have  
k
( 0)b =
k
 2
( )
2 ( 1)
l mt a n
k k t n
∗∂ −= ,∂ +  (13) 
where  is the competitive wage,  (see Section 2). Intuitively, (13) is understood as 
follows. If  is large, individuals have little access to the labor market. So most of them 
are unemployed. As the distribution becomes more unequal, more individuals are placed 
nearer the firms and thus get employed (see Figure 3 – note that since the equilibrium wage 
is increasing in the number of firms, 
a cw
m
w a∗ ≤  always holds.) Put differently, the marginal 
cost that each firm faces (in equilibrium) is ( ) 2 ( 1) ( )i i iMC l kt n l m k t= + + − . As  
increases, more individuals are located nearer the firm, which reduces the term 
k
( )m k t− . 
Besides, with a greater , the value of the density function (k ( ) 1 2 )f x k= /  is smaller. So 
the firm must pay more to employ any amounts of labor, which increases the marginal cost 
through the term . The original marginal cost curve crosses with the curve for a 
greater  at  (Figure 4). Thus each firm’s employment increases iff 
, which reduces to 
2 ( 1) ikt n l+
k 1 2( 1)il n= / +
1 2( 1) ( )in l k/ + > ,n 0mt a− > . Since total employment increases iff 
each firm’s employment increases, total employment increases iff 1 .  2( 1) ( )in l k/ + > ,n
For the effect on poverty, differentiating (9) with respect to  gives  k
 22 (1 )
P z l
k k t
α
α k
∗∂ ∂= − −∂ + ∂  (14) 
 
As  increases, the extent of poverty among workers decreases because the number of 
individuals with any levels of income  decreases. This is expressed as the first term 
of the right side. Clearly, if employment increases with an increase in inequality, poverty 
decreases. The point here is that as long as  
k
(1 2 )k/
 ( )
1 (1
n a zm
n t )tα− <+ +  
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holds, even when employment decreases, poverty decreases. On the other hand, if the 
opposite inequality holds, employment decreases and poverty increases as the degree of 
inequality increases.  
It is worth noting that  
 
2
2 2
1( ) (
2 ( 1)
P l a m
n k n k k n t
α
∗∂ ∂ ∂ )= − = −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ +  (15) 
holds. Therefore if  is greater than , poverty decreases more with an increase in 
inequality the more competitive is the labor market. In addition, the impact of increased 
competitiveness on poverty reduction is greater the more unequal are individuals.  
m cw t/
Furthermore, we have  
 
2
2( ) 02 ( 1)
P l n
a k a k k t n
α
∗∂ ∂ ∂= − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ + >  (16) 
So increases in  increase poverty more (or decrease poverty less) the higher is firms’ 
productivity. Also, the impact of productivity growth on poverty reduction is less the more 
unequal are the individuals.  
k
 
5. Conclusion 
How does the extent of poverty in an economy change if labor market competitiveness, 
firms’ productivity and inequality in terms of individuals’ access to labor markets change? 
This paper shows that increases in market competitiveness and labor productivity reduce 
poverty. The effect of inequality on poverty is ambiguous. However, in the case of a linear 
revenue function for example, poverty decreases as inequality increases if individuals have 
little access to the market. In addition, we also investigate the effects of each pair of the 
factors on poverty. First, it is established that, under certain conditions, the impact of 
productivity growth on poverty reduction is bigger the more competitive is the labor 
market. It is worth noting that this result, combined with the effect of competitiveness on 
poverty, gives two reasons why market competitiveness is desirable: (i) it contributes to 
poverty alleviation directly by inducing higher employment, and (ii) the more competitive 
the market, the bigger the impact of productivity growth on poverty reduction. Second, it is 
also shown that the impact of productivity growth on poverty reduction is smaller the more 
unequal is the economy. Third, in the case of a linear revenue function, the analysis shows 
9 
that if individuals have little access to the labor market, the impact of increased 
competitiveness on poverty reduction is bigger the more unequal are individuals.  
 
Appendix:   The Case of a General Revenue Function 
In this appendix, we explore the case of a general revenue function to see if the results in 
the main text are robust against changes in functional form. In general, the results in terms 
of the first-order derivatives of employment and poverty persist for any functional forms 
which satisfy ( ) 0R l a l∂ , / ∂ > , 2 2( ) 0R l a l∂ , / ∂ ≤  and 2 ( ) 0R l a a l∂ , / ∂ ∂ > . On the other 
hand, the complementarity between competitiveness and productivity, for example, holds 
under certain conditions.  
For example, let us consider the effects of competitiveness and productivity on 
employment and poverty. Suppose that the firms’ revenue function is of the form ( )iR l a, , 
where  is employment and  is a technological parameter. As stated above, we assume 
, , and 
il a
1 0R l R∂ / ∂ ≡ > 2 2 11 0R l R∂ / ∂ ≡ ≤ 2 12 0R a l R∂ / ∂ ∂ ≡ > . So as  increases, the 
marginal revenue of employment increases. Given the revenue function and a wage rate , 
the firm’s profit function is given by 
a
w
( ) ( )l R l a wlπ = , − . The inverse labor supply function 
is the same as in the main text ((2)).  
Given (2) and the total labor demand of the other firms, il− , firm ’s profit function is of 
the form  
i
 ( ) ( ) [2 ( ) (i i i i i il l n a m k t R l a kt l l m k t l) ]π − −; , , , , , = , − + + −  
By the first-order condition (and ( 1)il n− il= − ), the equilibrium labor demand of each firm 
is given implicitly by the following condition:  
 1( ) 2 ( 1) ( )i iR l a kt n l m k t
∗ ∗, = + + −  (A−1) 
The equilibrium total employment and wage are, respectively,  
 il nl
∗ ∗=  (A−2) 
and  
  (A−3) 2 (w ktl m k∗ ∗= + − )t
 
By differentiating (A-1) with respect to n , we have  
10 
 
11
2 0
2 ( 1) ( )
i i
i
l ktl
n kt n R l a
∗ ∗
∗
∂ = − <∂ + − ,  
So the effect of increased competitiveness on the equilibrium employment is given by  
 11
11
(2 ( )) 0
2 ( 1) ( )
i i
i
i
l kt R l a ll l n
n n kt n R l a
∗ ∗∗
∗
∗
∂ − ,∂ = + = >∂ ∂ + − ,
i
∗
 
 
Besides, by differentiating (A-1) with respect to , we get  a
 12
11
( ) 0
2 ( 1) ( )
i i
i
l R l a
a kt n R l a
∗ ∗
∗
∂ ,= >∂ + − ,  
So we have  
 0ill n
a a
∗∗ ∂∂ = >∂ ∂  
Therefore, (10) and (11) hold true for any functional forms.  
The second derivative of the equilibrium employment with respect to market 
competitiveness and labor productivity is given by  
      12 11 111 1122
11
( )(2 ( )) 2 ( ( ) ( )( )
[2 ( 1) ( )]
il
i i i i a
i
)iR l a kt R l a kntl R l a R l al
a n kt n R l a
∗∂∗ ∗ ∗ ∗∗
∂
∗
, − , − , + ,∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ + − ,
∗
≥
 (A−4) 
The above expression is positive iff  
        (A−5) 11 12 112 11 12 111[(2 ) 2 ][2 ( 1) ] 2 0i ikt R R kntR l kt n R kntR R l
∗ ∗− − + − −
Hence if, say,   and ( )a 111 0R ≤ 112 0R ≤  hold, (A-4) is positive. The intuition behind this is 
given in Figure 5. As n  increases, the marginal cost curve becomes steeper. Since , 
the marginal revenue curve shifts upwards as a  increases. Besides, if , the 
marginal revenue curve also becomes steeper. As a result, the ratio of the decrease in each 
firm’s demand to the original demand is smaller for greater . Thus, the increase in total 
demand with an increase in the number of firms, 
12 0R >
112 0R ≤
a
i il n l n
∗ ∗+ ∂ / ∂ , is greater for larger a .  
On the other hand,  
 ( ) 0l
n a
∗∂ ∂ ≥∂ ∂  (A−6) 
holds iff  
            (A−7) 11 12 121 11 12 111[(2 ) 2 ][2 ( 1) ] 2 0i ikt R R kntR l kt n R kntR R l
∗ ∗− − + − − ≥
11 
The above condition is satisfied with strict inequality if, for example,   and 
.  
( )b 111 0R ≤
121 0R ≤
Thus (12) holds iff (A-5) and (A-7) are satisfied. Both conditions are satisfied by, among 
others, quadratic functions and a class of separable functions ( ) ( ) ( )i iR l a r a h l, = , where 
, , , and .  0r′ ≥ 0h′ > 0h′′ < 0h′′′ ≤
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Figure 1. "Distance" to the Firms and Individual Incomes 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Competitiveness, Productivity and Employment ( )a a n n′ ′< , <  
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Figure 3. Inequality and Employment 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Inequality and the Marginal Cost of Labor ( )k k′<  
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Figure 5. Complementarity between Productivity and the Number of Firms ( , a a′< n n′< ) 
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